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The author draws from Jacques Derrida’s and Walter Benjamin’s writings on 
memory in order to argue that as these two thinkers deal with the simultaneity 
of the diachronic and synchronic dimension of time they open up the 
possibility of thinking about the relation between memory and narrative in a 
more complex way. These two theorists affirm the discontinuity and the non-
recognition between past events and present discourses and show the danger of 
conflating memory and narrative without the awareness of its limits. 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
“I have never known how to tell a story. 
And since I love nothing better than memory and Memory itself, Mnemosyne, I 
have always felt this inability as a sad infirmity. Why am I denied narration? Why 
have I not received this gift (doron) from Mnemosyne?” 
 (Jacques Derrida, Mémoires pour Paul de Man, 1988:27) 
 
Between January and February of 1984, three weeks after the death of his 
friend Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida gave some lectures on memory, which 
were published two years later. He opens his lectures with the following 
question: Why do those who love Mnemosyne lack the ability to tell stories? Is 
it possible to narrate a story out of our memories? 
 In one way or another, studies on memory have closely followed the 
definitions of mnēmē and anamnēsis outlined by Aristotle in De memoria et 
reminiscentia. To simplify somewhat, we might say that the former is related to 
a simple evocation of the past and the latter to an active reproduction of the 
past. Bergson defined two concepts of memory along these same lines: 
memory as durée and memory as imagination. The first was associated with 
those actions which resulted from a continuous learning process. In contrast, 
the second entailed the souvenir or representation of a certain fact that 
happened in the past (Bergson, 1913). The problems concerning the definitions 
of memory involve the perception of how different forms of time 
consciousness can be related. To what extent is the act of telling stories, which 
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involves anamnēsis, that is creative thinking and imagination, opposed to 
mnēmē? How to relate durée, continuity in habits and forms, to representation? 
How to relate memory with narration? 
 In what follows, I will draw from Jacques Derrida’s and Walter 
Benjamin’s writings on memory in order to better understand the 
interrelationship between memory and narrative. I will focus my analysis on 
two basic texts written by them on the issue of memory: Mémoires pour Paul 
de Man (Derrida 1988) and On Some Motifs in Baudelaire (Benjamin, 1968; 
1939). 
 
 
The Inability to Tell Stories Out of Our Memories 
 
If we accept that memory involves the new in every act of repetition, we must 
also accept that memory can neither retrieve past experiences as such, 
reconstruct the past anew altogether, nor be associated with on-going traditions 
capable of perpetuating themselves into the present. 
 In the first lecture about memory, Derrida argues against the Hegelian 
dialectical conception of history. To Derrida, recognition between past and 
present events is not possible. As Derrida reads Hölderlin’s poem, Mnemosyne, 
he describes memory as an “impossible mourning” or “mourning in default” 
(Derrida, 1988, 27-57). There is no mourning or there is mourning in default 
because the object of mourning does not exist in itself, since it lives in “us.” He 
says that memory does not have an object in itself to be remembered and, 
therefore, we can never hope to uncover this object. He is critical, therefore, of 
approaches that consider memory as the retrieval of a past that can be thought 
as an entity detached from the present. As he writes about mourning in default, 
he writes about mourning without any subject to be mourned. 
 As Derrida criticises the possibility of recognition between past and 
present he is also rejecting the idea that the retrieval of the past can bring 
knowledge and the promise of freedom. These ideas are based on the belief that 
there is a dialectics between rationality and reality. He argues that Hegel, in his 
Encyclopedia, committed a mistake when he opposed Erinnerung to 
Gedächtnis and thought that these experiences could be linked by dialectical 
thought. Hegel defined Erinnerung as reminiscence, that is, the memory 
capable of interiorising lived experiences. Memory was the poetic experience 
of death, the relation with the essence of being, which was thought within a 
non-temporalised past. By contrast, Gedächtnis was defined as simultaneously 
reflexive memory and the mechanical faculty of memorisation. Hegel thought 
of a dialectical relation between Erinnerung and Gedächtnis. For Derrida, there 
is no dialectical relation between them, because these terms do not exist 
separately from one another. Memory is a continuous movement, “in memory 
of” rather than “memory” in itself. There is no past independent of the present, 
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as there is no present independent of the past. Memory can never rescue the 
past through reflexivity since there is no past in itself to be rescued. 
 The second aspect that I would like to emphasise is that the philosopher 
refuses the idea that memory could be considered as a narrative of the past that 
results from the individual’s psychological faculty. For him we are never we-
ourselves (Derrida, 1988:49). It is believed that memory differs from narrative 
because it is capable of attaching emotions to facts and by this way it is capable 
of retrieving the past as lived experience. But to think of narratives of the past 
as a mere reinvention of the past would be a mistake, because these narratives 
are never circumscribed by the narcissistic fantasy of our subjectivities. What’s 
more, even the attempt to analyse narrative as the result of interactive acts of 
remembering and forgetting that take place in the present would be mistaken. 
Derrida clearly rejects an experience that pretends that it is entirely present to 
itself in any particular time. 
 Therefore, Derrida denies to an individual or to individuals in interaction 
the ability to recreate the past because he emptied the concept of memory from 
any allusion to subjectivity as a self-enclosed entity. To him, the past would 
never allow itself to be reanimated within consciousness. As individuals 
remember, they do not have the ability to see anything with new eyes, since 
they are inscribed in a chain with different and unpredictable meanings. There 
is a law beyond any kind of interiorisation or subjectivity (Derrida, 1988:53-
57). Therefore, the denial of creativity is crucial for Derrida. Thoughts, bodies, 
voices, looks and the soul of the dead other, although in the form of signs, 
symbols, images and mnemonic representations - that is, separate fragments - 
will never be completely dead and will live in us. The presence of the dead 
body in us means that we are not given the gift of creativity. 
 Third Derrida argues against the Heideggerian notion of being in time, 
since it still works within the limits of the binary constitution of metaphysics. 
He doubted the ability of consciousness to grasp what might be understood as 
the text within the temporal horizon. According to him, the “chain” to which 
we belong is very far from the image of the continuous flux within 
imagination. He writes about the “law” of the text, which applies not only to 
the attempts to deal with tradition, but also to those directed towards the 
uncertainties of the unconscious. To Derrida, Heidegger failed to perceive that 
the trace is not only prisoner of itself, but also a prisoner of the text, because he 
did not have the perception of the trace itself. 
 Like Foucault, and Nietzsche before them both, Derrida does not believe 
that social and political thinkers can bring the past into the present, either by 
recognition, or by the interpretation of its form or content without carrying all 
the constraints that are within the present. History, oral history, cultural 
history, tradition, memory, reflexive memory, mnemonic memory, 
psychoanalysis, none of them hold the possibility of going beyond the order of 
name. The same goes for the proposals of the relatively-opened future within 
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reflexive imagination. Such attempts to deal with memory can only lead to the 
creation of a concept that entails a teleological version of either the past or the 
future. 
 The concept of time in Derrida’s writings yields the understanding that 
there are neither fixed things nor absolute subjectivities about which we can 
think. As he writes that we can only refer to “in memory of”, he writes about 
différance, with the letter “a”, as a way of explaining that there is a movement 
of continuous production of differences without ever achieving identity. To 
him, if there is the archiviolithic drive, this is never present in persons, neither 
in itself nor in its effects (Derrida, 1995:25). He emphasises, therefore, the 
movement of rupture, disjunction and heterogeneity. There is no meaning to be 
grasped from the past outside the order established in the present, although the 
present order cannot be freed from the past either. Concerning memory, it is 
possible to say that we have the illusion that memory carries duration, but 
memory is not detached from the act of the narrative itself. In short, we do not 
tell stories out of our memories, because memories are within our narratives. 
 
 
The Modern Inability to Tell Stories Out of Our Memories 
 
In the above-mentioned essay on Baudelaire, Benjamin analysed Marcel 
Proust’s definition of two different kinds of memory: involuntary and 
voluntary. These definitions hold strong parallels with those already described 
in the previous section, from the Greek’s notions of mnēmē and anamnēsis to 
Bergson’s definitions of durée and imagination. To Benjamin, while 
involuntary memory was associated with simple evocation, voluntary memory 
meant the remembering that was in the service of the intellect, that is, the 
voluntary recollection of past events as the intentional conservation of the past. 
 Benjamin related involuntary memory to Erfahrung, and associated it with 
the experience that enters tradition. The experience of time that is possible 
through involuntary memory is not the one that will find identification with a 
past event, but the one that will be perpetuated as transmitted meaning within 
tradition. Benjamin’s understanding of Erfahrung was very close to the 
concept of tradition described by hermeneutic approaches. In contrast, he 
associated voluntary memory with Erlebnis, a concept described by Willhelm 
Dilthey as the human experience of life, in which the permanent content of 
what was experienced was merged with the immediacy with which this content 
was grasped. 
 Benjamin criticised both the concept of Erfahrung, which according to him 
was based on the assumption of continuous time, and the concept of Erlebnis 
since this latter emphasised the sphere of a certain temporality within human’s 
life (Benjamin, 1968; 1939:155-200). He, therefore, distanced himself from the 
hermeneutic and phenomenological notions of tradition. He contented that 
Heidegger sought in vain to rescue history for phenomenology, since he did it 
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abstractly, that is, through the concept of historicity. History could not be 
considered as one more category of knowledge, because any kind of 
knowledge was distorted by history. In addition, he wrote that: “the historical 
index of the images does not simply say that they belong to a specific time, it 
says above all that they only enter into legibility at a specific time” (Benjamin, 
1989:50). 
 At this stage, it should be obvious that Benjamin and Derrida’s notions of 
temporality have many common aspects. The concepts of temporality 
underlying their writings hold some strikingly affinities. They both rejected the 
premise of a continuous and homogeneous temporality as well as subjectivist 
notions about the reconstruction of the past. For them, neither does the past 
cast its light on what is present, nor does the present cast its light on what is 
past. Benjamin, like Derrida, did not believe that it would be possible to tell 
stories out of our memories. Also to Benjamin, narrative retained its primacy 
over memory. However, unlike Derrida, who has dedicated his life-work to 
developing the concept of différance in a direct dialogue with the philosophical 
tradition, Benjamin never proposed his approach as a philosophy of life. The 
inability to tell stories out of memories was the result of the ongoing movement 
of history, that is, of modernity. While Derrida emphasised the order of name, 
Benjamin focused on the investigation of dream-images. 
 To Benjamin Proust’s attempt to merge memory and narrative could not be 
generalised. He stressed that this attempt was in vain because there has been 
different sorts of experience throughout time. To him, the shock experience 
was the experience of modernity. Benjamin, therefore, pointed out to what he 
called phantasmagorias or dream-images, which can be understood as 
fragmented narratives, and as such, as a source of knowledge. The project to 
which he dedicated most of his research, the Arcades, entailed the disclosure of 
the imprints of the nineteenth century’s changes on intimate areas of life and 
work in Paris. He focused on a catalogue of themes and a gallery of types, 
which varied from warehouses to the flâneur. 
 Benjamin was deeply convinced that the meaning within modernity could 
be revealed by dream-images. He attributed the task of this revelation to 
historical materialism, which could blast the mystical monads in which past 
and present were merged in a fight against the constraints of structures that 
reproduced themselves throughout time. Neither was the historian’s instrument 
made up of interpretative or explanative theories nor was its object made up of 
social constructions created in the present. Whether talking about monads, 
constellations, dream-images, phantasmagorias or Ur-phenomena, Benjamin 
was referring to the merging of the Now and Then. In his words, “an image is 
that in which the Then and the Now come together into a constellation like a 
flash of lightening” (Benjamin, 1989:50). Memory as collective representation, 
that is, as narrative was to be demolished as just another mythology of 
modernity. This mystical conception was based on the understanding that 
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although every past and present could be synchronic with certain moments in 
history, history itself was the diachronic dimension that could allow the 
legibility of the moment. 
 In Derrida’s thinking, to the infinite collection of significations within 
memory there is only the infinite collection of significations of our thoughts. 
We could say that “in memory of”, like a traumatic experience, holds no 
separation between past and present and bears no witness either. Benjamin also 
wrote about the increase of traumatic experience in modern times. Whereas 
Derrida denounces a prison of meaning as ephemeral and transitory, Benjamin 
pointed out that past injustices must be redeemed in the present. Both authors 
wrote about a situation in which the past never achieves full recognition 
whatever the historical context within which it is considered. The concern with 
knowledge about the past is replaced by a concern with the political 
consequences inherent to the awareness of time. There is no past to be 
retrieved, there is no present facing death, only justice to be faced or done. 
 The beauty of Benjamin’s writings is that at the same time they pointed out 
the limits in understanding, they affirmed the mediated character of knowledge. 
Benjamin held a strong sensibility towards silent wars among different ways of 
being, of experiencing time. We not only experience the past in different ways, 
but according to our possibilities. Also in remembering it is necessary to 
consider who are those who struggle for life. I would say that, according to 
Benjamin, the merging between narrative and memory has not completely 
vanished, otherwise it could not be perceived in modern times. The 
contribution of Benjamin to social theories of modernity is that he dealt 
throughout his work with the historical condition of human experience and its 
limits. We not only have disjointed expressions of life, but are disjointed 
ourselves. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many authors have argued that the recent emphasis on memory by a myriad of 
studies has had the predictable effect of neutralising the awareness of what 
happened in the past. The attempts to narrate, for instance, traumatic situations, 
such as the holocaust, the bombing of Hiroshima, the Vietnam war, and the 
fratricide massacres in Yugoslavia, have created the disturbing effect of 
emptying the tragedy that these catastrophic events meant in the past. In 
Georges Bataille’s words, the revelation of the bombing of the city of 
Hiroshima is in a sense the opposite of a revelation, since the human 
representation of this catastrophe is not capable of giving the dimension of the 
event. According to him, horror has no words to describe itself and feeling 
cannot be the point of departure for action. As one takes refuge in the world of 
activity, one does not solve the problems of the profound violence and the 
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impossible horror which are basic component of human life (Bataille, 1995; 
1947:228-9). 
 As both Derrida and Benjamin wrote about memory and narrative, they 
showed the impossibility of telling stories out of our memories. For them 
collective memory should be distinct from any self-sustained act of 
reconstruction of the past as well as distinct from living and unmediated 
traditions. Although for these authors the past is always created anew, and 
becomes virtually whatever societies decide, the past is not just an object 
negotiated by contemporary individuals. They yield the understanding that the 
lived past also marks out spatial and cultural boundaries, which are responsible 
for important and crucial aspects of social life that have been forgotten. 
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1 This text is a short version of the article “Memory and Narrative in Social Theory: 
The Contributions of Jacques Derrida and Walter Benjamin”, Time and Narrative, 
2001, forthcoming, in which there is a more in-depth analysis about Derrida and 
Benjamin’s conceptions of historical time as well as the relation of their thoughts 
with contemporary social theory. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
